Governing 'as if': global subsidies regulation and the benchmark problem by Lang, Andrew
  
Andrew Lang 
Governing 'as if': global subsidies 
regulation and the benchmark problem 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
 
Lang, Andrew (2014) Governing 'as if': global subsidies regulation and the benchmark problem. 
Current Legal Problems, 67 (1). pp. 135-168. ISSN 0070-1998 
 
DOI: 10.1093/clp/cuu006 
 
© 2014 The Author 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/59897/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: November 2014 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 1 
Governing ‘as if’: 
 
Global subsidies regulation and the benchmark problem 
 
 
Andrew Lang* 
 
 
As a result of the extraordinary work of Foucault, Shapin and Schaffer, Porter, and 
many others, we are familiar with many of the practices of governance which 
emerged during the 19
th
 century at the intersection of the modern social sciences and 
the modern state, as ‘naturalised’ knowledge of an objectified social body formed the 
foundation of specific kinds of social and political order. But over the course of the 
20
th
 century, critiques of objectivity have become commonplace, and a post-positivist 
epistemological revolution has taken root in many quarters. How, then, have practices 
of governance-through-knowledge modified themselves in response to a century of 
such critiques? This paper takes inspiration from the work of Jasanoff, Riles, Latour 
and others, to identify a mode of 'governing as if': a pragmatic mode of governance 
which works not through the production of objective knowledge as the shared 
epistemic foundation for political settlements, but rather by generating knowledge 
claims that stabilise social orderings precisely through their self-conscious partiality, 
contingency and context-dependence. This argument is developed using the 
illustration of global subsidies regulation in World Trade Organization law, focussing 
in particular on the knowledge practices by which particular conceptions of ‘the 
market’ are produced and deployed in the course of its operation. The paper argues 
that the standard criticisms of naturalised economic conceptions of the ‘free market’, 
developed in various scholarly traditions throughout the 20
th
 century, do not provide 
an adequate account of economic governance working in ‘as if’ mode, either 
positively or normatively. It further argues, following Riles, that such regimes of 
governance derive their effectiveness fundamentally from their ‘hollow core’, and that 
it is in the constant and active work of ‘hollowing out’ that we are likely to find their 
characteristic modalities of power and underlying structural dynamics. 
 
 
I. The ‘market’ and its objectification 
 
In their classic study of the birth of modern scientific methods in the middle of the 
17
th
 century, Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer show very clearly the intimate 
connections that exist between the way we produce knowledge about the world and 
the way we choose to govern ourselves in it. The ‘practices involved in the generation 
and justification of proper knowledge’, they suggest, are ‘part of the settlement and 
protection of a certain kind of social order’.1 Following the lead of these and other 
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authors, this paper takes as its broad theme the ‘co-production’2 of knowledge and 
governance – with a more focussed interest in the co-production of economic 
knowledge and economic governance. Its point of departure is a relatively familiar 
story about the emergence of an objectified understanding of market relations through 
the development of political economy and modern economic science from the mid 
1700s onwards, and its articulation within various practices of economic statecraft 
over the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries. 
 
The classical political economists and their peers were among the first to think of 
economic life as belonging to its own distinct domain, and to imagine the market as a 
having its own internal laws of motion. These laws of motion were on the whole 
understood to be natural, in the sense of being a spontaneous product of relations 
between individuals, and deducible from certain self-evident propositions about 
human nature. A central task of political economy, accordingly, was to discover and 
describe the systemic forces and laws of motion which governed economic life, and in 
doing so to produce the ‘market’ as an object of scrutiny. As Colin Gordon reminds 
us, the ‘new objectivity of political economy [did] not consist solely in its occupation 
of a politically detached scientific standpoint: more profoundly, it inaugurate[d] a new 
mode of objectification of governed reality’.3 This way of understanding and 
representing economic life was both a product of, and helped to produce, a particular 
rationality of government. On one hand, the objectification of the market limited the 
practices of economic statecraft, on the basis that the practical ability of governments 
to work against the inherent dynamics of markets were understood to be 
fundamentally limited. On the other, it also shaped the purposes of economic 
governance, which were re-oriented towards ensuring the integrity and proper 
functioning of these inherent dynamics. In Foucault’s words, this was a rationality of 
government which sought above all to ‘ensure that the necessary and natural 
regulations work, or even to create regulations that enable natural regulations to 
work.’4  
 
For reasons that are too well known to repeat, new demands for state action to remedy 
and ameliorate the operation of actually existing markets emerged from the mid- to 
late-19
th
 century through the first half of the 20th. The new techniques of economic 
management characteristic of this period were critically enabled by new practices of 
knowledge production within the economic sciences. As has been chronicled by a 
number of authors, the development of comprehensive national economic statistics, 
alongside the creation of macroeconomics as a subfield of economics, were central to 
this history.5 This was the period in which the national economy as a whole was 
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mapped and systematically measured for the first time,6 with the emergence of new 
and more detailed national statistics in this period, from cost of living indices, 
population level consumption data, a variety of labour indices, and so on, all directly 
related to the political priorities of the emergent welfare states of the period. These 
new domains of knowledge production oriented the new interventionism by 
reconstructing economic life in terms amenable for state action. ‘Unemployment’ was 
invented as a particular kind of social problem, in part through practices of data 
collection on joblessness. GDP was invented and offered itself as a target of state 
programs of industrial development. For Timothy Mitchell, indeed, 
 
[t]he idea of the economy in its contemporary sense did not emerge until the middle 
decades of the twentieth century. Between the 1930s and 1950s, economists, 
sociologists, national statistical agencies, international and corporate organizations 
and government programs formulated the concept of the economy, meaning the 
totality of monetarized exchanges within a defined space. The economy came into 
being as a self-contained, internally dynamic, and statistically measurable sphere of 
social action, scientific analysis and political regulation.7 
 
The formal disciplinary separation of economics from politics and sociology around 
the turn of the century also reinforced this mechanical image of the economy as a self-
contained sphere with its own internal dynamics. In the first half of the 20
th
 century 
economics became in part an ‘engineering’ science, geared towards the production of 
usable knowledge for the emerging administrative and welfare state.8 At about the 
same time, the academic discipline of economics also began self-consciously to aspire 
to the formal rigour of the natural sciences. The formalisation of the discipline, which 
had begun already with Walras in the late 19
th
 century, entrenched itself firmly in 
subsequent decades, particularly after World War 2.9 The emphasis placed on the 
formulation of general and abstract laws, the use of mathematical techniques, and the 
production of parsimonious models were all aspects of a culture of objectivity keenly 
attuned to the epistemic virtues of positivist social science. 
 
In this mode, economic knowledge did the ‘costly work of objectification’ of the 
market, stabilizing a common description of economic situations, and thus providing a 
shared basis for public and private action.10 Economic statecraft based its legitimacy 
on objective technical knowledge, obtaining consent to its large scale projects of 
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in economics (Routledge 2012), 112. See also generally Mary S Morgan, The World in the Model: How 
Economists Work and Think (Cambridge University Press 2012). 
 4 
social and economic transformation in significant part through the scientific 
construction of a shared economic reality.11 
 
It is commonplace to note that, from at least the 1970s onwards, public scepticism 
about both the possibility and desirability of ‘objective’ social scientific knowledge in 
an uncomplicated sense has become especially visible and widespread. Around this 
time, in Dorothy Ross’s summation: 
 
[t]he social scientists’ project was buffeted not only by political shifts but also 
be long-accumulated discontents with modern society. The most vocal critics 
repudiated the liberal Enlightenment vision of modernity guided by science 
and technocracy, declaring it to be monolithic and coercive, and sought 
alternative, postmodern bases for individual freedom. Theoretical attacks on 
positivism and new linguistic critiques of knowledge fuelled the postmodern 
vision and worked more broadly to reopen fundamental questions about the 
viability of the social science disciplines and their relationship to [natural] 
science and the humanities.12 
 
Economic knowledge, needless to say, has not been immune to such currents. 
Particularly in the present moment, it is fair to say that economics, at least as much as 
all natural and social scientific disciplines, ‘live[s] under constant suspicion’, and is at 
times of stress routinely suspected of ‘providing knowledge that aggravates our 
condition rather than improves it’.13  
 
What has happened, then, to techniques of economic governance which are enabled 
by the epistemic objectification of the market? How have practices of knowledge 
production been transformed in response to post-positivist critiques of the 
objectifications of modern economic science? And has their articulation within 
regimes of governance given rise to new or modified forms of economic statecraft? 
What new ‘practices of objectivity’ have emerged to shore up claims to objectivity in 
a post-positivist world? And how, indeed, has the aspiration to objectivity been 
displaced or redefined as the guiding orientation of governmental knowledge 
practices? 
 
These are the broader questions which animate this paper. In order to sharpen them a 
little, it is useful to set out three different critical responses to the objectification of 
the market, all of which have been with us in various forms since at least the early 
20
th
 century. All seek to undo the work of objectification performed by mainstream 
economic thought, but in significantly different ways. First, it is argued that the 
objectified image of the market which emerges from mainstream economic analysis is 
false, because the assumptions on which it is based are wrong. In this category, for 
example, we find the common claim that the rational actor hypothesis is wrong, either 
because humans are prone to systematic and predictable cognitive biases in their 
decision-making (behavioural economics), or because ‘social norms’ influence social 
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behaviour within the market just as much as they do outside it (certain strands of 
economic sociology14). Second, even where one accepts (as a positive claim) the 
separation of the economic and the social, others have noted that this separation is 
socially constructed – and that this fact is obscured by the objectification of the 
market in most economic thinking. Polanyí’s account of the social construction of 
markets provides the classic example of this line of criticism,15 though the new 
institutionalists in the Northian line also fall into this category. A third response, by 
contrast, emphasises the fact that the imagined ‘ideal market’ is a partially 
indeterminate concept – very different from claiming that it is inaccurate as a 
description of actually existing markets. This line of argument derives fundamentally 
from the legal realists and early institutionalists, who observed that factors of 
production are nothing other than legal entitlements, and that there is in principle no 
set of criteria internal to economics (including, lest we fall into circularity, ‘the 
market’ itself) by which we can determine what form these legal entitlements would 
ideally take in a ‘perfect’ market.16 
 
Although all three of these lines of criticism have been influential at different periods 
over the last century, in this paper I am primarily interested only in the last of them: 
the indeterminacy of the concept of the market. More specifically, my aim is to 
explore and understand what happens when regimes of governance which operate by 
means of market benchmarking – that is to say, measuring and disciplining deviations 
from market outcomes – confront the problem of the indeterminacy of the market 
benchmark itself.  
 
In what follows, I examine an illustrative regime of governance-by-market-
benchmarking – namely, global subsidies regulation under the law of the World Trade 
Organization. I show how this regime is confronted at every turn by the problem of 
the indeterminacy of the concept of the market. And I describe the knowledge 
practices by which particular notions of the market come nevertheless to be treated as 
valid, or at least to be accepted as the basis for action for the purposes of WTO 
subsidies law. My argument will be that knowledge practices in the field of global 
subsidies regulation do not aspire to produce facts of the sort valorised by economic 
science – that is to say, facts which are true to nature, value-free, observer-
independent, applicable across contexts, and durable. Such knowledge practices do 
not objectify the market in the manner of much economic thinking, but instead merely 
invite us to act as if ‘the market’ were coextensive with one of its particular instituted 
forms. In other words, they merely create an ‘as if’ market benchmark for us to accept 
only for certain limited purposes, and only in a strictly bounded context. 
 
 
II. Global subsidies regulation and benchmark problem 
                                                        
14 I am thinking here of the ‘embeddedness’ thesis of the sort associated with Granovetter, eg, Mark 
Granovetter, ‘Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness’ (1985) 91 
American Journal of Sociology 481–510. 
15 Karl Polanyi, Origins of Our Time: The Great Transformation (V Gollancz, 1945).  
16 See, eg, Robert L. Hale, ‘Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State’ (1923) 38 
Political Science Quarterly 470–494; Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning’ (1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710; Kennedy, ‘The Role of Law in Economic Thought: 
Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities’ (1985) 34 American University Law Review 939; Coase, 
‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1. 
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International rules on subsidies have developed in a halting and rather piecemeal way 
in the 70 years since the end of World War 2. Although the stillborn ITO Charter 
contained a prohibition on export subsidies,17 this was not included in the GATT 
1947. Instead, the drafters of the latter document opted in Article XVI for a relatively 
loose combination of a notification requirement coupled with an obligation to ‘discuss 
… the possibility of limiting the subsidization’ with those trading partners suffering 
‘serious prejudice’ as a result of the subsidies in question.18 In addition, flexibility to 
provide subsidies to domestic producers was maintained through an exemption from 
the national treatment obligation in Article III:8(b). Partially offsetting these 
permissive provisions was Article VI:3, which permitted GATT contracting parties to 
impose countervailing duties on subsidized imports, subject to certain procedural 
safeguards. The notion of a ‘subsidy’, however, was nowhere defined. 
 
In 1955, further obligations on export subsidies were added to Article XVI. The new 
paragraph 4 envisaged that agreement would be reached to abolish all export 
subsidies on non-primary products by 1958, and provided for a ‘standstill’ for existing 
subsidy programs until then.19 In relation to primary (mainly agricultural) products, 
contracting parties agreed that they should ‘seek to avoid the use’ of export subsidies, 
and not to use them in a manner which would result in their having a ‘more than 
equitable share of world trade’ of the product in question.20 While these amendments 
still did not address the definitional issue, in 1960, during the negotiations designed to 
put GATT Article XVI:4 into effect, a Working Party produced an illustrative list of 
measures which could reasonably be treated as export subsidies, in the absence of a 
general definition of the concept.21 This report was adopted by the Contracting Parties, 
and has continued to act as an important reference point since then.  
 
The Tokyo Round saw the adoption of the Subsidies Code, a new and at the time 
important agreement signed to by 23 GATT contracting parties. It contained a more 
categorical prohibition of export subsidies, as well as some elaborated disciplines on 
domestic subsidies, and new constraints on the unilateral imposition of countervailing 
duties. But this was superseded some 16 years later by the new Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (‘SCM Agreement’) negotiated during the 
Uruguay Round, which came into force in 1995.22 The SCM Agreement contained, 
for the first time, a general definition of the concept of a ‘subsidy’: under Article 1.1 
of the agreement, a subsidy is deemed to exist, where: (a) there is either a ‘financial 
contribution’ by a government or public body or ‘income or price support’; and (b) a 
‘benefit is thereby conferred’ on the recipient. Such subsidies are only subject to the 
disciplines contained in the agreement if they are ‘specific’.23 As regards substantive 
disciplines, the SCM Agreement continues the separate treatment of export and 
                                                        
17 United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Final Act and Related Documents (24 March 
1948) E/CONF.2/78, arts 25-28. 
18 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (30 October 1947) 55 UNTS 194, art XVI. 
19 GATT 1947, art XVI:4. As it happened, agreement proved impossible, however, and in the end only 
a subgroup of 17 industrialised countries reached an agreement in 1960.  
20 GATT 1947, art XVI:3. 
21 Working Party Report on ‘Provisions of Article XVI:4’ (19 November 1960) BISD 9S 185. 
22 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/9 (‘SCM 
Agreement’). 
23 SCM Agreement, art 1.2. 
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domestic subsidies found in earlier texts. On one hand, export subsidies and so-called 
import substitution subsidies are prohibited outright, though there is an exemption for 
agricultural subsidies, which are addressed in a separate agreement.24 On the other, 
domestic subsidies are ‘actionable’ under the agreement only if they cause, or threaten 
to cause, ‘adverse effects to the interests of other Members’, a concept which is 
elaborated in considerable detail in Articles 5 and 6. In respect of both actionable and 
prohibited subsidies, the injured Member has a choice of remedies: to bring a 
complaint to the dispute settlement body seeking removal of the subsidy; and/or to 
unilaterally impose countervailing duties on the subsidized import to offset the effect 
of the subsidy.25 Part V of the agreement then imposes a series of important 
procedural and substantive limits on the use of such countervailing duties. 
 
I noted above that I am interested in this body of law because of the way that it 
operates by reference to a market benchmark. Most importantly, the market is used as 
a yardstick to define the concept of a ‘subsidy’: in order to qualify as a subsidy, a 
governmental measure must make the recipient better off as compared to the position 
they would have enjoyed in the marketplace. Thus, the Appellate Body has made it 
abundantly clear that ‘the marketplace provides an appropriate basis for comparison 
in determining whether a ‘benefit’ has been ‘conferred’.26 Similarly, the notion of 
‘income or price support’ has been similarly interpreted as involving a comparison 
with the existing price, and a market-oriented benchmark of an ‘equilibrium’ price.27  
 
Indeed, the technique of market benchmarking is central to almost every significant 
element of subsidies regulation. Under Article 3, whether a subsidy is de facto 
contingent upon export performance depends on the existence of an incentive ‘to 
export in a way that is not simply reflective of the conditions of supply and demand in 
the domestic and export markets undistorted by the granting of the subsidy’.28 Under 
Articles 5 and 6, the question whether a subsidy has caused ‘adverse effects’ or 
‘serious prejudice’ requires in most cases a detailed counterfactual analysis of the 
likely prices, trade flows, and market shares in an imagined market in which the 
subsidy was not granted. Under Article 14, the amount of a subsidy is to be calculated 
by comparing the financial contribution made by the government with one or other of 
a number of market benchmarks, including ‘the usual investment practice … of 
private investors’, ‘the amount that the firm would pay on a comparable commercial 
loan which the firm could actually obtain on the market’, ‘adequate remuneration … 
[as determined] in relation to prevailing market conditions’.29 And the question of 
                                                        
24 SCM Agreement, art 3.1. 
25 SCM Agreement, art 10, footnote 35.  
26 WTO, Canada: Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft – Report of the Appellate Body (2 
August 1999) WT/DS70/AB/R (‘Canada – Aircraft (AB)’) [157]. 
27 WTO, China: Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical 
Steel from the United States – Report of the Panel (15 June 2012) WT/DS414/R [7.85]  ‘the concept of 
‘price support’ … includes direct government intervention in the market with the design to fix the price 
of a good at a particular level, for example through purchase of surplus production which price is set 
above equilibrium’. 
28 WTO, European Communities and Certain Member States: Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft – Report of the Appellate Body (18 May 2011) WT/DS316/AB/R (‘EC – Aircraft (AB)’) 
[1102]. 
29 SCM Agreement, art 14, which provides context for interpretation of the notion of ‘benefit’ under 
article 1.1(b) (Canada – Aircraft (AB) [158]). Notes also that the Illustrative List of export subsidies in 
Annex I contains a similar set moves, eg, in paragraphs (d), (j), (k). 
 8 
whether the sale of a subsidized entity extinguishes the effects of a subsidy requires a 
comparison between the price paid with a counterfactual benchmark of ‘fair market 
value’.30 Other examples can easily be found. 
 
The point, in brief, is that the technique of market benchmarking is central to WTO 
subsidy regulation: recourse to the market standard is used to resolve disagreements 
not only about what constitutes a subsidy, but also questions of characterisation, 
causation, quantification and extinction. In this respect, as Zheng has chronicled, the 
WTO adopted the approach which emerged in domestic US countervailing duty 
practice over the course of the 1980s.31 It turns out, however, that the ‘market’ does 
not quite deliver on its promise of providing a stable and determinate reference points 
for resolving subsidy disputes. For one thing, as those who specialise in this area of 
WTO law understand well, there are many different possible markets that one might 
choose as one’s benchmark, and this choice hugely affects the substantive scope, 
content and dynamics of the law. Which market, then, should be used for the purpose 
of benchmark analysis?  
  
An obvious first choice for a suitable benchmark may be the ‘market-as-is’. Where a 
business receives a loan from the government, for example, does it not make sense to 
compare the terms of this loan to the terms that business could have received in the 
existing financial market? One problem with this commonsense benchmark has to do 
with the selection of an appropriate market transaction for comparison. Since all 
commercial transactions are at some level unique, any determination that two are 
relevantly comparable is subject to the classic finitist critique of all acts of 
classification, and therefore necessarily encounters problems of indeterminacy.32 To 
illustrate the point more concretely: in order to determine a comparable marketplace 
transaction, it may be necessary, for example, to determine the risk profile of the loan 
in question. How risky, precisely, was the commercial project being funded, and what 
premium would the market have charged in light of this risk? But the riskiness of a 
project is never a matter of uniform agreement amongst market participants – indeed, 
necessarily not, if the market is to function well – so that a determination of this sort 
necessarily involves choosing one among many possible views of market 
participants.33 (The convention of citing a single ‘market price’ tends to obscure the 
                                                        
30 See, eg, WTO, United States: Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and 
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom – Report of the Appellate Body (10 
May 2000) WT/DS138/AB/R [68]. 
31 Wentong Zheng, ‘The pitfalls of the (perfect) market benchmark: the case of countervailing duty law’ 
(2010) 19 Minnesota Journal of International Law 1. See also Daniel K. Tarullo, ‘Beyond normalcy in 
the regulation of international trade’ (1987) 1 Harvard Law Review 546. 
32 For a succinct statement of the finitist critique, see Barry Barnes, David Bloor, and John Henry, 
Scientific knowledge: a sociological analysis (University of Chicago Press 1996), esp 55-59. For an 
illustration of such insights in respect of subsidies regulation and the comparability of transactions, see 
Luca Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC law in Comparative Perspective 
(Oxford University Press 2009), chapter 8. See also Matthew Parish, ‘On the private investor principle’ 
(2003) 28 European Law Review 70. 
33 For two examples of the difficulties that this might give rise to in practice, see WTO, Japan: 
Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories from Korea – Report of the Appellate 
Body (28 November 2007) WT/DS336/AB/R [25]-[29] (regarding the relevant of the different interests 
of ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ creditors); WTO, Brazil: Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, Recourse 
by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU – Report of the Appellate Body (21 July 2000) WT/DS46/AB/R 
[73]-[74] (showing the range of factors which may be taken into account in determining the 
comparability of transactions).  
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fact that this general price is typically a statistical artefact produced in complex ways 
from multiple actual prices in the market.) Or, take the example from a recent case of 
the rent charged by a German municipality for the provision of specialised industrial 
land to Airbus. Is the appropriate comparator the generally prevailing rate for 
industrial rentals in that municipality, or the rate paid for similarly specialised sites 
elsewhere in the country or region, or some other rate? If the former, should the 
generally prevailing rate be modified upward to reflect the additional value to Airbus 
of the specialised nature of the land, and its proximity to its construction facilities – or 
downward to reflect the additional value to the lessor of the long-term nature of the 
rental agreement, the secure credit of Airbus, and so on?34 The point is that different 
market participants will make such judgments differently, and that there is therefore 
no single ‘existing’ market standard by which to make such determinations. Even 
small differences can in some cases be very significant to the outcome. 
 
A second difficulty with the market-as-is benchmark is that the existing market may 
be so affected by the measure in question that it does not provide even an approximate 
indicator of the position which would exist in the absence of that measure. This is a 
sufficiently common situation that it has led in many cases to the choice of a different 
benchmark: namely, the ceteris paribus benchmark.35 This is an imagined market 
which corresponds to the existing market in all respects, except that it is free of the 
impugned measure and its distorting effects.36 But this benchmark brings its own 
difficulties. One is that it is extremely difficult to control for the indirect, synergistic 
and long-term effects of a measure, with the result that this imagined market 
counterfactual may in many cases be unreliable, even on its own terms. Another, as 
Horn and Mavroïdis note, is that this benchmark may be entirely fanciful, for the 
reason that, in the absence of the measure in question, the government may resort to 
other measures to achieve the same or similar policy objectives.37 To construct a 
meaningful ceteris paribus benchmark, it follows we must ask what measures is it 
likely to put in place instead? But how is this to be determined? Here we come for the 
first time to the central problem: that the bare economic notion of ‘the market’ itself 
provides no criteria by which to answer to this question, and therefore is inadequate 
on its own to determine the content of the market benchmark. 
 
A further difficulty with both the ‘market-as-is’ and the ceteris paribus benchmarks is 
that both may represent markets which are heavily ‘distorted’38 – not just by the 
measure under review, the problem just discussed, but more broadly. If that is the case, 
then even if we accept that these two benchmarks may help to identify and remove 
any unfair competition caused by the measure in question, they would still leave in 
                                                        
34 EC – Aircraft (AB) [985]-[990]. 
35 Zheng (n31) 21-28. Note also Diamond’s statement that countervailing duty law require a 
‘comparison between two worlds: one in which the government payment has been made and one in 
which is has not’: Richard Diamond, ‘Economic Foundations of Countervailing Duty Law’ (1989) 29 
Virginia Journal of International Law 767, 783. 
36 It is worth noting that the term ceteris paribus benchmark is used in slightly different ways in the 
literature, and that my use differs here from some others, eg Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis, 
‘United States—Preliminary Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada: 
What is a subsidy?’ in Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis (eds), The WTO Case Law of 2002: The 
American Law Institute Reporters’ Studies (Cambridge University Press 2005). 
37 Ibid., 232. 
38 We will see in a moment that this term runs into the same problems as the term ‘market’, but for the 
moment to speak in such terms makes the point clearer. 
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place a distorted market characterised by potentially myriad other sources of potential 
unfairness.
39
 Normatively, it matters tremendously whether the measure in question is 
best characterised as a market distortion or a corrective to a pre-existing distortion, 
but it turns out that neither the ‘market-as-is’ benchmark nor the ceteris paribus 
benchmark takes adequate account of this distinction. Thus, for example, Alan Sykes 
notes that such benchmarks take no account of “the income, payroll, excise, and other 
taxes paid by firms … the regulatory burdens that may be imposed by employment 
and discrimination laws, workplace safety rules, environmental regulations … [the 
impact of] general infrastructure, such as road building and  government- owned 
utilities, [on] the costs of firms … [or of the way that] the educational system may 
have aided or disadvantaged an industry”,40 all of which may entirely offset or swamp 
the effects of subsidy. Since it is clearly impossible to control for all of these 
measures simultaneously, the result is that one has to choose which governmental 
measures to account of in a benchmark analysis, and which to relegate to a taken-for-
granted background. Again, here is our central problem: the bare notion of ‘the 
market’ provides no help in this regard, and therefore cannot determine the content of 
the benchmark to be used. 
 
There is a more fundamental problem still. Ignoring for the moment the obvious 
practical difficulties which it entails, the logical conclusion of this line of reasoning is 
to choose as one’s benchmark the idealized, perfect market, free of all ‘distortions’. 
This would seem at first glance to provide a determinate and coherent standard for 
benchmark analysis, at least in principle. But here we reach the heart of the 
indeterminacy of the notion of the market. As we have known for over a century, it is 
in fact impossible to imagine a market free of governmental action.41 Factors of 
production are nothing more than legal entitlements, and what is traded in a 
marketplace are nothing other than legal rights and duties. These legal rights and 
duties may, of course, take many forms, so that in order to give concrete content to 
the abstract notion of a ‘market’, one must specify (or implicitly assume) their content. 
It will be immediately clear that the notion of a ‘perfect market’ cannot without 
circularity help in that task: it cannot provide the yardstick by which to choose 
between its own different institutional forms. Nor can it help at all in the crucial task 
of conceptually separating those laws which establish the necessary conditions for 
markets to exist, and those which ‘distort’ pre-existing market outcomes. Thus, we 
discover again that, at its deepest level, the concept of the market is indeterminate in 
the sense that it does not include within itself the necessary criteria for its own 
definition. To be clear: this does not mean at all that a particular version of the market 
cannot be devised and used, but it does mean that the reasons for choosing one 
version over another are necessarily extrinsic. 
 
The upshot of this literature is that there is clearly no natural, self-evident, objectively 
determinable baseline against which to identify and evaluate subsidies. It turns out 
                                                        
39
 The presumptive logical relevance of this for subsidies regulation is illustrated by the comment of 
the WTO, European Communities: Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips from Korea – Report of 
the Panel (17 June 2005) WT/DS299/R [7.175]: ‘without [the] objective of curtailing trade distortion, 
it would not make sense to impose these disciplines in an international trade agreement.’ 
40 Alan O. Sykes, ‘The questionable case for subsidies regulation: a comparative perspective’ (2010) 2 
Journal of Legal Analysis 473, 502. 
41 See above n16, also Justin Desautels-Stein, ‘The market as a legal concept’ (2012) 60 Buffalo Law 
Review 387. 
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that the problem with the market benchmark is not just there is a choice to be made as 
to which market one adopts as one’s reference point. The more fundamental difficulty 
is that all of the available choices are beset by problems of conceptual incoherence, 
substantial indeterminacy, or both. This is rather important: the concept of the market 
really is offered as the stable, substantive yardstick by reference to which subsidies 
are defined, measured, and discipline – but ultimately it is necessary to look beyond 
and outside this concept for principles both to choose between alternative market 
visions, and to substantiate them in particular contexts. Where, then, do we find the 
firm ground which provides the substantive orientation for this regime of governance? 
 
Although not always expressed in this way, this set of problems has been well 
understood within the relevant literature for a very long time. Jackson’s seminal 1969 
textbook on GATT law, for example, notes that ‘almost any tax advantage (interest 
deduction, accelerated depreciation, or, indeed even low taxes) could arguably be a 
subsidy’.42 ‘In some sense,’ he also remarks elsewhere, ‘every government action that 
impinges on the economy creates a ‘distortion’.43 Hudec, too, notes that, in principle, 
‘anything the government does which alters [a] producer's costs or revenues in a 
favorable direction could … be called a subsidy’.44 As scholarship on subsidies re-
ignited in the 1980s, Snape observed, with others, that ‘the term subsidy can be all-
embracing’ and that ‘virtually every government action can be regarded as a subsidy 
for someone’.45 Tarullo has famously made a similar argument.46 More recently, 
Sykes and Rubini have reflected extensively on the problem and its implications, 
while Trebilcock and Howse have lamented the ‘largely incoherent’ ideas at the heart 
of global subsidies regulation.47 Indeed, it is hard to find a single major writer on 
GATT/WTO subsidies regulation over the last four decades who has not at some 
point noted the lack of a coherent means for defining what constitutes a ‘subsidy’. 
There is evidence, too, of the same awareness in diplomatic circles. Lamp, for 
example, tells the story of the group of experts appointed to address the trade impact 
of agricultural subsidies, who complained of the practical impossibility of measuring 
such impact, and noted that the degree of protectionism would be ‘define[d] by the 
methods employed for its measurement.’48 Lester, too, finds evidence of such 
awareness during the interwar League of Nations economic conferences.49  
 
                                                        
42 John H. Jackson, World trade and the Law of GATT: a Legal Analysis of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (Bobbs-Merrill 1969), §8. See also Warren F. Schwartz and Eugene W. Harper, ‘The 
Regulation of Subsidies Affecting International Trade’ (1972) 70 Michigan Law Review 831–858. 
43 John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations 
(MIT Press 1997), 298. 
44 Cited in Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid (n32) 92. 
45 Richard H. Snape, ‘International regulation of subsidies’ (1991) 14 The World Economy 139, 140. 
46 Tarullo (n31). 
47 Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid (n32), especially chapters 2 and 8; Sykes 'The 
Questionable Case' (n40); Michael J. Trebilcock, Robert L. Howse, and Antonia Eliason, The 
regulation of international trade (4th edn, Routledge 2012) 395. It is worth noting that this is, in the 
end, just a particular illustration of the broader baseline problem discussed by Sunstein and others: 
Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Lochner’s Legacy’ (1987) 87 Columbia Law Review 873. 
48 Lamp, ‘Lawmaking in the Multilateral Trading System (2013, unpublished dissertation, on file with 
author), 253, citing GATT Documents COM.II/103 (29 November 1960) and COM.II/W.7 (23 
September 1960). See also Working Party Report on ‘Provisions of Article XVI:4’ (19 November 
1960) BISD 9S 185, noting the difficulties of providing a clear definition. 
49 Simon Lester, ‘The problem of subsidies as a means of protectionism: Lessons from the WTO EC - 
Aircraft case’ (2011) 12(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 97, 99. 
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While such concerns have led some to call for the abandonment altogether of the 
attempt to craft general rules for subsidies, in this article I want to go in a different 
direction. How is it that, despite all its fundamental conceptual difficulties, ‘the 
market’ is able to act as a operative benchmark in the day by day, case by case, 
practice of global subsidies regulation? Given its inherent indeterminacy, how is its 
stability nevertheless achieved, at least for the purposes of a particular case? What, in 
short, are the legal knowledge practices by which a particular notion of the market is 
produced, made to hold, and accepted as the foundation for global subsidies 
regulation? 
 
 
III. The market as a construct of legal knowledge 
 
The incorporation in legal texts of economic concepts such as ‘subsidy’ and ‘market’ 
can give rise to two familiar modes of legal reasoning. In the functionalist mode,
50
 the 
jurist draws heavily on economic knowledge in her interpretation of such concepts. 
Such an approach often begins by defining certain issues as questions of fact not law 
– such as the characterisation and definition of the market, the causal effect of 
subsidies, and so on – and gives to the tools of economic expertise the primary role in 
the determination of such facts. In this mode of reasoning, the determination of such 
facts through the use of economic techniques goes a long way to determining the legal 
issue which is ultimately in question. As others have noted, law in the functionalist 
style ‘borrows’ its objectivity from the economic expertise on which it draws – where 
‘objectivity’ is understood prominently to include an aspiration towards factual 
accuracy, or truth-to-nature.  The ‘as if’ mode,51 by contrast, begins with the opposite 
claim that the incorporation of economic concepts into law transforms their nature: 
they become legal concepts, the defining feature of which is precisely their (potential) 
divergence from their economic counterparts. In this mode, the questions of market 
definition and causation are not primarily factual matters, but legal questions, for 
which economic expertise may be helpful, but very far from determinative. In this 
mode, the law produces its objectivity precisely as a result of its departure from 
economic expertise. As others have shown, and as I will illustrate further below, law 
in this mode produces the stability of its knowledge claims in part through its ability 
to cut short debates about the adequacy and accuracy of economic expertise, by 
reference to an alternative set of techniques and criteria of validity, and through the 
production of legal fictions.52  
 
                                                        
50
 See generally Kennedy (n16). 
51 I take inspiration in my use of this term from Annelise Riles, Collateral knowledge: legal reasoning 
in the global financial markets (University of Chicago Press 2011); Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels, and 
Annelise Riles, ‘From Multiculturalism to Technique: Feminism, Culture and the Conflict of Laws 
Style’ (2012) 64 Stanford Law Review 589. See also Hans Vaihinger, The philosophy of ‘As if’: a 
system of the theoretical, practical and religious fictions of mankind (K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & co., 
Harcourt, Brace & co. 1924). 
52 In this section, I follow in the footsteps of others who have investigated the law’s epistemologies, 
and the ways in which it departs from those of modern science, eg, Alain Pottage and Martha Mundy 
(eds), Law, Anthropology and the Constitution of the Social: Making Persons and Things (Cambridge 
University Press 2004); Bruno Latour, The Making of Law: an Ethnography of the Conseil d’Etat 
(Polity 2010); Sheila Jasanoff, Science and Public Reason (Routledge 2012); Marilyn Strathern, 
Kinship, Law and the Unexpected: Relatives are Always a Surprise (Cambridge University Press, 
2005).  
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It is important to note at the outset that both of these modes are powerfully present in 
the operation of global subsidies regulation.53 There are many features of WTO 
dispute settlement which attest to the WTO’s continuing aspiration to produce 
objective knowledge (in the sense of knowledge which is true to nature) in the 
functionalist mode. The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding makes clear, for 
example, that one of the core tasks of Panels is to make an ‘objective assessment of 
the facts of the case’ before it.54 In pursuing this task, Panels have broad powers to 
consult independent experts on any questions that they think appropriate, and parties 
routinely use evidence from economic experts in their submissions in subsidy cases.55 
Indeed, in the Subsidies Agreement this is taken a step further, through the creation of 
a Permanent Group of Experts, which (in principle at least) is empowered to provide 
advice in a number of contexts on the existence and nature of subsidies.56 
Furthermore, the Appellate Body has on occasion powerfully expressed its 
commitment to empiricism in the determination of the market benchmark wherever 
feasible.57 And there is certainly a very strong strand of secondary literature which 
exhorts WTO tribunals to rely more heavily on technical economic expertise in its 
subsidies jurisprudence, or criticises such tribunals for their failure to apply economic 
concepts and analytical techniques faithfully and rigorously.58 WTO dispute 
settlement, in this view, is committed to truth-seeking in a very basic way, and its 
legitimacy depends in significant part on the extent to which its procedures for fact-
finding ‘reliably produce empirically verifiable’ knowledge claims.59  
 
The focus of this paper, however, is on the legal techniques and practices 
characteristic of the ‘as if’ mode. This is largely because the functionalist style is still 
rather obviously vulnerable to the critiques of objectivity noted earlier, and therefore 
tells us little about how techniques of economic governance have adapted and 
responded to such critiques. It is a central claim of this article that whenever such 
critiques of objectivity are particularly visible or relevant, that is where the legal 
                                                        
53 Bonneuil and Levidow reach a similar conclusion, in the context of their analysis of the EC–Biotech 
dispute: Christophe Bonneuil and Les Levidow, ‘How does the World Trade Organization know? The 
mobilization and staging of scientific expertise in the GMO trade dispute’ (2012) 42 Social Studies of 
Science 75.  
54
 Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (15 April 1994) 
LT/UR/A-2/DS/U/1 (‘DSU’) art 11. 
55 DSU art 13. 
56 SCM Agreement arts 24.3, 24.4 (though this body has never been used). See generally J. Kazeki, 
‘Permanent Group of Experts under the SCM Agreement’ (2009) 43 Journal of World Trade 1031. 
57 See, for one among many examples, WTO, United States: Subsidies on Upland Cotton Recourse to 
Article 21.5 by Brazil – Report of the Appellate Body (2 June 2008) WT/DS267/AB/RW [356] and 
surrounding. 
58 See, eg, Luca Rubini, ‘What does the recent WTO litigation on renewable energy subsidies tell us 
about methodology in legal analysis? The good, the bad and the ugly’ EUI Working Paper 2014/05; 
Christopher Thomas, ‘Of Facts and Phantoms: Economics, Epistemic Legitimacy, and WTO Dispute 
Settlement’ (2011) 14 Journal of International Economic Law 295, including the material cited in 
footnote 69 of that article. Also note Andre Sapir and Joel P. Trachtman, ‘Subsidization, price 
suppression, and expertise: causation and precision in Upland Cotton’ (2008) 7 World Trade Review 
183, 205-6: ‘Just as biology provides the best tools available to determine whether there is a scientific 
basis for a sanitary measure, modern economics provides the best tools available in order to determine 
the effects of subsidies on prices. So, where the SCM Agreement calls for a determination by a Panel 
of whether a subsidy has caused significant price suppression, a Panel would be wise to use the tools 
provided by economics, or to engage expert economists, or to evaluate reports provided by expert 
economists.’ 
59 Thomas (n58) 300.  
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techniques and knowledge practices associated with the ‘as if’ mode become 
predominant – and that the more such critiques are generally internalised, the more 
that the law will work in this latter mode. It is worth noting that none of the legal 
techniques I discuss in this section are in themselves particularly new – in fact they 
are quite standard practice in many areas of law. That is not the point. What I aim to 
show in this section is how the application of such techniques to the notion of the 
‘market’ in global subsidies regulation produces an artefact which is very different 
from the objectified ‘market’ produced by modern economics (and, by extension, 
from that which is produced by the law working in the functionalist mode). In 
particular, I want to show that the core features of this artefact are its partiality, 
purposive quality, and context-boundedness – in direct contrast with the aspirations to 
holism, observer-independence, and generalisability characteristic of the knowledge 
claims produced by the techniques of statistics and economics. 
 
First, as to the question of partiality. Here, I simply want to call attention to those 
moments in which WTO tribunals put an end to debate about the appropriate market 
benchmark to be used by self-consciously calling attention to the necessary partiality 
of their own perspective. For example, in the original panel proceedings in Brazil-
Aircraft, one of the questions was whether certain elements of Brazil’s export 
financing programme were protected by the wording of Item (k) of the Illustrative 
List of Export Subsidies. Brazil argued that the payments in question were not ‘used 
to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms’ but instead merely 
offset Canada’s subsidies to its own aircraft industry, and addressed the ‘Brazil risk’ 
that the market priced into credit terms given to Brazilian companies (in part on 
account of economic policies of the Brazilian government itself).60 This argument 
raised directly the difficulties referred to earlier, concerning the slippery distinction 
between measures which distort and those which correct pre-existing distortions, and 
the question of what governmental measures to take as given for the purposes of 
subsidies analysis. But the panel dealt with such problems swiftly, short-circuiting 
potentially complicated analysis with a simple legal technique, noting the absence of 
any express textual support for such a position in the SCM Agreement: 
 
In no case is it suggested that whether or not a benefit exists would depend upon 
a comparison with advantages available to a competing product from another 
Member … Nor can we find any suggestion in either Article 3.1(a) of the SCM 
Agreement or the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies that whether a measure is 
a prohibited export subsidy should depend upon whether the measure merely 
offsets advantages bestowed on competing products from another Member.61 
 
For good measure, the Panel went on to note in addition that ‘there is no hint that a 
tax advantage would not constitute an export subsidy simply because it reduced the 
exporter's tax burden to a level comparable to that of foreign competitors’.62 This was 
so, even though such questions would matter tremendously if one were to assess the 
competitive effects of the subsidy holistically, with a view to correcting market 
                                                        
60 WTO, Brazil: Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Report of the Panel (14 April 1999) 
WT/DS46/R (‘Brazil-Aircraft (Panel)’) [7.21]-[7.22].   
61 Brazil-Aircraft (Panel) [7.24]-[7.25]. It is worth noting that the opposite interpretation was textually 
open, precisely because the notion of ‘benefit’ is not defined in the agreement, and the guidance 
provided by the context (notably Article 14) is so thin. 
62 Brazil-Aircraft (Panel) [7.25]. 
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distortions or leveling the competitive playing field. In an interesting way, the legal 
objectivity of the Panel’s analysis here is shored up precisely by its adoption of a self-
consciously partial benchmark – entirely inadequate from an economic perspective –
apparently dictated by the text of the agreement. 
 
Brazil subsequently amended its measure, so that the interest rate payments in 
question were tied to a market benchmark related to the prevailing US Treasury Bond 
10 year rate, plus an additional spread of 20 basis points. Again, the difficult question 
was raised whether this rate represented a reasonable approximation of what a 
commercial actor in the market might ask. But again the question was avoided 
through the use of a fictional benchmark referred to in the text of the agreement. 
Given the express reference in item (k) of the Illustrative List to ‘international 
undertaking[s] on official export credits’, the Panel (following an earlier Appellate 
Body ruling63) determined that one appropriate benchmark would be the relevant 
OECD Commercial Interest Reference Rate, as calculated according to the 
methodology set out in Article 16 of the OECD Arrangement.64 Aware that this 
reference rate may or may not correspond to a ‘true’ market rate, the Panel made it 
clear that it was open in principle for Brazil to prove that lower rates were actually 
commercially available on the market – even if in practice the prevalence of 
government involvement in this sector made finding appropriate commercial 
comparators almost impossible.65 
 
The same self-conscious adoption of a fictional or partial benchmark can be seen in 
some of the Panel decisions in the Softwood Lumber litigation. One question which 
famously arose in that litigation was whether the domestic Canadian market for 
stumpage provided an appropriate benchmark, given the thorough degree to which it 
was structured and affected by government action. In US – Softwood Lumber III, the 
Panel explicitly eschewed the economist’s preferred benchmark of a ‘hypothetical 
undistorted or perfectly competitive market.’66 Without contesting the substantive 
claim that the domestic market was in some sense fundamentally distorted, the Panel 
noted that ‘if the drafters of the SCM Agreement had wanted to exclude the use of 
market prices in case of price suppression due to the government's involvement, they 
would have explicitly provided so, but they have not.’67 A subsequent Panel noted, 
significantly, that ‘we do not believe that it would be appropriate for this Panel to 
substitute its economic judgment for that of the drafters.’68 It is true that this approach 
was subsequently revised by the Appellate Body, which found textual support for the 
rejection of such a distorted benchmark in certain circumstances. But the Appellate 
                                                        
63 WTO, Brazil: Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Report of the Appellate Body (2 August 
1999) WT/DS46/AB/R (‘Brazil-Aircraft (AB)’) [182]. 
64 WTO, Brazil: Export Financing Programme for Aircraft Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
Canada – Report of the Panel (9 May 2000) WT/DS46/RW (‘Brazil-Aircraft (21.5, Panel)’) [6.84] and 
surrounding. 
65 WTO, Brazil: Export Financing Programme for Aircraft Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
Canada – Report of the Appellate Body (21 July 2000) WT/DS46/AB/RW (‘Brazil-Aircraft (21.5, 
AB)’) [64]. 
66
 WTO, United States: Preliminary Determinations with respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from 
Canada – Report of the Panel (27 September 2002), WT/DS236/R (‘US-Lumber CVDs Prelims’) 
[7.50]. 
67 US-Lumber CVDs Prelims [7.52]. 
68 WTO, United States: Final Countervailing Duty Determination with respect to Certain Softwood 
Lumber from Canada – Report of the Panel (29 August 2003), WT/DS257/R [7.59]. 
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Body still drew a clear line between the legal benchmark defined in the text of the 
agreement, and the sort of market benchmark used in economic analysis.69 And again, 
it was precisely the drawing of this distinction – the assertion of a distinction of the 
legal concept of a market from that which obtains in economic analysis – as well as 
the deliberate blindness to some of the facts of the situation, which provided an 
indication of the legal objectivity of its decision.
70
  
 
One can, furthermore, see a similar dynamic at work in the Boeing and Airbus 
decisions, which concerned the competitive subsidization of the world’s two largest 
manufacturers of civil aircraft. Notwithstanding the fact that the two cases together 
found both manufacturers to be subsidised, in each case a partial benchmark was 
adopted which reflected an imagined market in which only one side’s subsidies were 
removed. Not only were such benchmarks mutually inconsistent, they contained more 
than a small degree of obvious fictionality, given the dependence of these subsidies 
on one another.  
 
In all of these cited instances, then, the benchmarks used represented explicitly 
‘distorted’ markets, or fictions which bore no necessary connection to any known 
market, as their basis to define, characterise, or determine the effects of, the measures 
in dispute. In such cases, we search in vain for a naturalized, objectified image of ‘the 
market’ as the benchmark by which to identify and assess subsidies. It may well be 
responded that this approach has a certain pragmatic utility – but of course this is 
precisely the point. The aspiration of the legal knowledge practices at work here is not 
the production of ‘true’ knowledge claims about the nature of the measures in 
question, their overall competitive effects, or the broader dynamics of the market in 
question. On the contrary, there is a deliberate eschewing of this aspiration, in favour 
of avowedly partial knowledge claims.71 
 
                                                        
69 WTO, United States: Final Countervailing Duty Determination with respect to Certain Softwood 
Lumber from Canada – Report of the Appellate Body  (19 January 2004), WT/DS257/AB/R (‘US – 
Lumber IV (AB)’) [100]-[101]. 
70
 For purposes of my argument, it does not ultimately matter whether this outcome was or was not 
mandated by the text of the agreement – what matters is that the legal system (whether as a result of he 
action of the drafters or the interpreters) self-consciously deploys a partial benchmark, and explicitly 
turns a blind eye to certain facts which would be relevant from the perspective of normative economic 
analysis. 
71 It is worth noting also that certain factual presumptions are commonly used in legal proceedings, but 
which are known to be strictly unjustified as accurate descriptions of reality. Sykes, for example, notes 
that the adverse competitive effects of subsidies depend, among other things, on whether the subsidy 
has an effect on the output of the recipient firm – but that WTO law does not on the whole require 
proof of such an effect, thus ‘presuming’ its existence as a practical matter: Alan O. Sykes, ‘The 
Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’, June 2003, U Chicago Law and 
Economics Olin Working Paper No.186, 20-1. For some other examples, see Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Treaty 
interpretation or activism?: comment on the AB report on United States - ADs and CVDs on certain 
products from China’ (2013) 12 World Trade Review 235, 237-8; Richard Diamond, ‘Privatization and 
The Definition of Subsidy: A Critical Study of Appellate Body Texturalism’ (2008) 11 Journal of 
International Economic Law 649, 672-3; J. Miranda, ‘Causal Link and Non-attribution as Interpreted in 
WTO Trade Remedy Disputes’ (2010) 44 Journal of World Trade 729, 734. Of course, it is perfectly 
possible to interpret these examples not as the production of true legal fictions in the sense described 
here, but merely as ‘good enough’ approximations of the truth: DP Steger, ‘The Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures Agreement: Ahead of its Time or Time for Reform?’ (2010) 44 Journal of 
World Trade 779, 780. 
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A second characteristic of the knowledge claims I am interested in is their purposive 
quality. If the objectification of the market requires knowledge claims which aspire to 
observer-independence, the legal construction of a market benchmark does precisely 
the opposite, producing images of the market which are explicitly contingent, in the 
sense that their validity purports only to be relative to the purposes for which they are 
produced. In the US-Foreign Sales Corporation case, a similar question arose as 
referred to above, namely whether it is appropriate to take into account the extent to 
which an apparent export subsidy may be justified because it corrects for an existing 
market disadvantage faced by domestic exporters.72 Here, the disadvantage was 
caused by the US decision – unlike other tax jurisdictions – to impose income taxes 
on resident corporations in respect of transactions occurring wholly outside US 
territory.  Again, the Panel refused to consider this disadvantage as relevant. This time, 
significantly, it justified its decision by reference to its own limited mandate, and the 
tax sovereignty of WTO members: 
 
the United States is free to maintain a world wide tax system, a territorial tax 
system or any other type of system it sees fit. This is not the business of the 
WTO. What it is not free to do is to establish a regime of direct taxation, 
provide an exemption from direct taxes specifically related to exports, and 
then claim that it is entitled to provide such an export subsidy because it is 
necessary to eliminate a disadvantage to exporters created by the US tax 
system itself.73 
 
The important point here is that the Panel’s choice of benchmark flowed directly from 
its understanding of the institutional context in which it operated: from where it stood, 
and given its mandate, it had no choice but to take the sovereign tax choices of WTO 
Members as given. 
 
Another clear example of this comes from the recent case of Canada – Renewable 
Energy, in which it was alleged that a series of measures taken by the Ontario 
government constituted impermissible subsidies to domestic producers of renewable 
energy. One of the claims made by the complainants in that case was that the prices 
paid to such suppliers under long-term contractual arrangements were so high as to 
constitute a subsidy, and the question arose as to how to define the appropriate market 
benchmark for purposes of comparison. Should the benchmark prices be calculated 
taking the government-mandated energy-supply mix as given, or should it be 
calculated as if such a policy regarding the appropriate supply was absent? Although 
the Panel (majority) and the Appellate Body differed on certain matters, in one aspect 
they were agreed: the energy supply-mix should be taken as given for the purposes of 
benchmark analysis: 
 
Government intervention in favour of the substitution of fossil energy with 
renewable energy today is meant to ensure the proper functioning or the 
existence of an electricity market with a constant and reliable supply of 
electricity in the long term … Although this type of intervention has an effect 
on market prices, as opposed to a situation where prices are determined by 
                                                        
72 WTO, United States: Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’ – Report of the Panel (8 
October 1999) WT/DS108/R (‘US – FSC (Panel)’) [7.121]. 
73 US – FSC (Panel) [7.122]. 
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unconstrained forces of supply and demand, it does not exclude per se treating 
the resulting prices as market prices for the purposes of a benefit analysis 
under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement .. Thus, where the government 
has defined an energy supply-mix that includes windpower and solar PV 
electricity generation technologies, as in the present disputes, a benchmark 
comparison for purposes of a benefit analysis for windpower and solar PV 
electricity generation should be with the terms and conditions that would be 
available under market-based conditions for each of these technologies, taking 
the supply-mix as a given.74 
 
Again, this conclusion is best understood as following from a particular understanding 
by the Panel and the Appellate Body of their own limited roles and tasks. The energy 
supply-mix was a central mechanism that the Ontario government used to pursue its 
social and economic objectives as it established wholesale energy markets, and it was 
neither the purpose of subsidy regulation, nor the task of WTO dispute settlement, to 
call those social and economic objectives fundamentally into question.75 The point 
here is crystal clear: what is happening in these and other76 examples is not the 
objective definition of a subsidy by reference to an idealised natural market; instead, 
there is the contingent claim that a certain kind of measure should (or should not) be 
treated as if it were a subsidy for present purposes, based on a particular 
understanding of the objectives of the Subsidies Agreement, and the institutional role 
of WTO dispute settlement. The notion of a subsidy, in other words, is only ever 
defined for a specific purpose and relative to a particular context. 
 
The same feature is also characteristic of scholarship addressing the benchmark 
problem in subsidies regulation. The very simple point that I wish to make here is that, 
when commentators seek to define the benchmark to used, they do so in the 
characteristic manner of lawyers: not by reference to some ideal of a neutral or 
objective standpoint, but by reference to their understanding of the purposes of the 
WTO’s subsidies rules. Thus, for example, Horn and Mavroidis, when considering the 
desirability of one suggested ‘no-subsidy benchmark’ note that the: 
 
main virtue of this definition is … that it is intimately related to the assumed 
purpose of the agreement, in that it neither directs Members to choose 
particular policies, nor to maximise some notion of global welfare, but to 
refrain from behaving in a beggar-thy-neighbour fashion.77  
 
In a separate publication, Grossman and Mavroidis come to certain conclusions about 
how a Panel ought to identify and measure the effects of a subsidy through a process 
of reasoning that begins with the claim that the primary objective of the SCM 
Agreement is to ‘discourage subsidies that might harm [foreign] producers’.78 
                                                        
74 WTO, Canada: Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy General Sector – Report of the 
Appellate Body (6 May 2013) WT/DS412/AB/R [5.190] (emphasis added). See also WTO, Canada: 
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76 One may cite, for example, US – Lumber IV (AB) [100]-[101]. 
77 Horn and Mavroidis (n36) 233.  
78 Gene M. Grossman and Petros C. Mavroidis, ‘United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties 
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Diamond argues that certain kinds of governmental measures are excluded from the 
scope of the SCM Agreement because it is ‘doubtful they will be manipulated for 
protectionist purposes’.79 Zheng criticises the AB’s use of the ‘undistorted market 
benchmark’ on the basis of the ‘disconnect’ between that benchmark and what he sees 
as the goals of countervailing duty law.
80
 Rubini, for his part, argues in certain 
circumstances for the use of a ceteris paribus benchmark on the basis that the purpose 
of subsidies regulation is (in significant part) to remedy distortions of competition.81 
Indeed, along with Sykes, Rubini is the scholar who has most clearly and 
unequivocally noted that one’s definition of subsidy necessarily depends on one’s 
view as to the purpose of subsidy regulation. He captures the point well, when he says, 
adapting the words of Hart, that the concept of a subsidy in WTO law is ‘not a fact, 
but an artificial construct of a given legal system for a practical purpose’.82 The claim, 
then, is never that something is a subsidy, but that it should be treated as if it is one, 
given the purposes of global subsidies regulation. Far from offering a general truth 
about the social world as it is, such claims purport only to be valid in the context, and 
for the purposes, for which they are produced. The contrast with the sorts of 
knowledge practices which seek to produce an objectified image of the market – and 
as a consequence an observer-independent definition of subsidies – is clear. 
 
The third characteristic is in some respects the logical counterpart to the first two: 
context-boundedness. The sorts of knowledge practices associated with the modern 
discipline of economics tend to be oriented towards the production of facts which 
‘travel’83 – that is to say, facts which are valid and usable beyond the contexts in 
which they are produced. Precisely the opposite is true, however, in the case of the 
knowledge claims made in the context of global subsidies regulation. Almost 
everything about the institutional context in which they are produced serves to limit 
their applicability and validity outside that context. Part of this has to do with the fact 
that the field of international trade law is a highly specialised one, which has 
historically cultivated a degree of detachment from other fields of international law, 
as well as from domestic regimes of economic governance. Given the WTO’s 
relatively self-contained nature, and its somewhat unique purposes and history, claims 
made about the nature and effects of subsidies for the purposes of WTO law tend to 
achieve little circulation outside that context, and are accorded little relevance once 
they do. There is, after all, no reason why the concept of a ‘subsidy’ in some other 
body of law should be identical to that contained in the WTO’s Subsidies Agreement. 
Still less is there any reason why economists (say) working in fields outside 
international trade should pay any attention whatsoever to the ways in which the 
WTO defines the concept of subsidies, or indeed the methodologies by which it does 
                                                                                                                                                              
Here Today, Gone Tomorrow? Privatization and the Injury Caused by Non-Recurring Subsidies’ in 
Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis (eds), The WTO Case Law of 2001: The American Law Institute 
Reporters’ Studies (Cambridge University Press 2003) 186. 
79 Diamond (n71) 665 (a position which implicitly but clearly links the definition of ‘subsidy’ with an 
assumed anti-protectionist purpose of the agreement). See also generally Lester (n49).  
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 Zheng (n31), 45ff.   
81 Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid (n32), 17  and L. Rubini, ‘Ain’t Wastin’ Time No 
More: Subsidies for Renewable Energy, The SCM Agreement, Policy Space, and Law Reform’ (2012) 
15 Journal of International Economic Law 525. 
82 Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid (n32), 17.  
83 I use the term in the same sense as in Peter Howlett and Mary S. Morgan, How Well Do Facts 
Travel?: The Dissemination of Reliable Knowledge (Cambridge University Press 2011). 
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so. This is particularly the case given the self-consciously partial and purposive nature 
of such definitions, just noted. 
 
In addition, this context-boundedness is also an effect of the particular style of 
decision-making often adopted in the WTO subsidies cases. For one thing, the highly 
fact-intensive nature of most subsidies decisions makes it difficult for many parts of 
the decisions to have great resonance and application beyond their own context. In 
addition, it is not uncommon for WTO tribunals to make decisions based heavily on 
the way that parties frame their arguments in the context of litigation. The most 
obvious examples are where the tribunal decides by reference to the absence of 
evidence or the burden of proof.84 Another illustration can be taken from the EC-
Aircraft case, where the Panel assessed the appropriate interest rate benchmark to be 
used to determine whether certain Launch Aid funding conferred a ‘benefit’ on 
Airbus. The parties submitted very different assessments as to what an appropriate 
market benchmark might be, but what is important here is that the Panel managed to 
avoid making its own specific, quantified determination of the benchmark. Instead, it 
offered complex arguments concerning the methodological flaws of each party’s 
evidence, and noted simply that the relevant risk premium lay somewhere between the 
benchmarks offered by the two parties. This, it turned out, was sufficient in the end to 
ground a finding of ‘benefit’ in respect of these measures.85 This characteristic 
vagueness, and the reluctance precisely to quantify, is also a feature of many 
countervailing duty cases, in which panels not uncommonly prefer to find general 
flaws in the benchmark adopted by the domestic tribunal, without unnecessarily 
taking the extra step of precisely determining their own.86 
 
A further illustration of this sort of context-dependent knowledge claim can be found 
in the practice of list-making. In the years before the creation of the Subsidies 
Agreement, one of the important techniques that negotiators used to define the object 
of subsidies regulation was the illustrative list. I referred above to the production in 
1960 of an illustrative list of export subsidies during the subsidies negotiation, and its 
incorporation, almost twenty years later, in the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code. Other 
lists of a similar nature were produced by specific countries in the context of GATT 
trade negotiations.87 GATT case law on subsidies also provided, in effect, the 
functional equivalent of an illustrative list, in the sense that the cases could be, and 
were, used to generate a series of examples of what was considered a subsidy within 
GATT circles during the time. Even after the adoption of the Subsidies Agreement, 
with its general definition of subsidies, this kind of ‘definition by list-making’ 
continued. As noted already, a further illustrative list of prohibited export subsidies 
was annexed to the agreement itself. Furthermore, the requirement to notify domestic 
subsidies under Article 25.4 of the agreement has yielded thousands of pages of 
reports listing subsidy measures established by WTO Members – even if such lists are 
uniformly criticized as incomplete and unreliable. 
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 See, for a few of many possible examples, Brazil-Aircraft (AB) [183]-[185]; Brazil-Aircraft (21.5, 
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86 WTO, Japan: Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories from Korea – Report of 
the Panel (13 July 2007) WT/DS336/R [7.304]-[7.315]. 
87 Some are referred to in Gary N. Horlick, ‘A Personal History of the WTO Subsidies Agreement’ 
(2013) 47 Journal of World Trade 447, at footnote 5; also (n31) 10.’  
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While list-making works to create a functional understanding of does and does not 
constitute a subsidy, it does so in an accretive rather than deductive manner. Such lists 
do not, that is to say, lay down a general definition of subsidies, such that specific 
cases of subsidies are determined through the application of this general definition. 
Rather, they refer to past practice as their pragmatic guide. They simply purport to 
record, at different points over time, what a relatively small group of people tends to 
treat as subsidies in the specific context of trade negotiations. These lists build on one 
another over time, in the sense that prior lists form the basis of subsequent lists, and 
inclusion in a series of lists over time is what passes for agreement that a particular 
kind of measure ‘is’ a subsidy. They are open-textured, in the sense that the list is 
envisaged to alter over time, and are typically stated be non-exhaustive. It will be 
clear that this sort of knowledge practice does not seek to ground its epistemic 
legitimacy in the sense that these lists constitute definitive, accurate, generalisable 
rigorously coherent measures of what ‘truly’ counts as a subsidy – quite the opposite 
in fact, as such a claim would reduce rather than enhance their credibility. Rather, 
their durability and legitimacy derives precisely from the limited and modest nature of 
the claims that they embody: merely that certain measures are to count as subsidies, in 
a certain context, and for certain purposes. 
 
Viewed as a system for identifying and measuring subsidies and their effects, then, 
the global trade regime operates in precisely the opposite way from modern 
objectivist economic science. While the scientific project consists in turning local 
observations into general, ‘mobile’, universally valid facts, the global trade regime 
works in the reverse manner, taking economic knowledge and, by incorporating it into 
formal and informal processes of legal reasoning, turning it into a set of highly 
context-bound, institution-specific knowledge claims about what constitutes a subsidy 
for local purposes. Indeed, I would argue that this is the trade-off at the heart of ‘as if’ 
knowledge practices: they are able to generate stability, effectively cutting short the 
debates to which the critiques of market objectification give rise; but they achieve this 
only by localising their claims to validity, and thereby giving up their ability to 
produce facts which ‘travel’. 
 
 
IV. Governing ‘as if’ 
  
In the previous section I asked what, precisely, is the nature of the knowledge claims 
at the heart of global subsidies regulation (in their post-functionalist, ‘as if’ mode)? 
We are now in a position to provide a list of some of their core features. First, as I 
have said, their claim to validity extends only to the context in which they are 
produced. Second, the representational quality of these knowledge claims is not 
central to their operation. ‘As if’ knowledge practices have very little aspiration to 
facticity: they do not seek to accurately represent the social world, but rather offer 
themselves as a tool for action within it.88 True, if they departed too radically from 
what counts at any point in time as commonsense reality, their ability to elicit 
acceptance would be undermined. But what matters much more is their ability to 
enable practical action. Third, ‘as if’ knowledge practices do not work by acting on 
our beliefs, but instead on our actions. They make no demands that we believe that 
this or that ‘really is’ a subsidy, or that the market ‘really would’ operate this or that 
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way in its natural and undistorted state. Instead they work by structuring our action – 
by embedding themselves as the premise of a domain of practical governance, and by 
inviting us to enrol ourselves in that domain of governance. Fourth, ‘as if’ knowledge 
claims have a particular logical structure. Objectifying knowledge claims take the 
logical form of ‘is’ statements: ‘this is a subsidy’. ‘As if’ knowledge claims take a 
different form: ‘this counts as a subsidy for certain purposes’. This is an adaptation of 
John Searle’s formulation of ‘institutional facts’: ‘X counts as Y in context C’.89 I find 
this a helpful formulation because it makes clear that an ‘as if’ knowledge claim 
always works in two directions: first, it defines a relation of practical equivalence (X 
counts as Y), and second, it specifies the context in which that relation holds (context 
C – here, the trade dispute at issue). 
 
Although I have used global subsidies regulation as my illustration, we should not 
imagine that this mode of governing is confined to the WTO. The practice of market 
benchmarking is everywhere in contemporary governance of economic life: as a 
fundamental part of international accounting standards; as a tool for determining the 
level of compensation for the expropriation of property; as the basis for the 
determination of market power in competition regulation – and so on. In all of these 
areas, one can point to a long tradition of post-objectivist thinking about the 
indeterminacy of the concept of the market and market prices. And, I suspect, one 
could tell a similar story to that which I have told about the movement in each of 
these governance regimes from a naturalised conception of the market produced by 
economic and statistical techniques, to one which operates on an ‘as if’ basis through 
the production of the market as a series of case-specific legal fictions.  
 
As I noted at the outset, Shapin and Schaffer have described the project of modern 
science as defining an objective reality in which we might all believe, and which 
might therefore form the shared epistemic basis of social order and political 
community. ‘As if’ knowledge practices, by contrast, seek to solve the problem of 
social and political order in the absence of a shared epistemic foundation. Their role, 
in the context of economic governance, is not the fabrication of ‘the economy’ or ‘the 
market’ as an object of shared knowledge, nor the stabilisation of a particular way of 
understanding the ‘market’ as the common basis for our intervention into it. Rather, 
they ask us merely to accept the utility of a certain way of defining ‘the market’ for 
certain specific purposes and contexts. The result is a self-conscious multiplication of 
many different images of the market, proliferating throughout different sites and 
locations of economic governance, none of which purports to have general validity or 
authority outside the context or dispute in which it is produced. If Shapin and Schaffer 
are correct in the historical story that they tell, we might reasonably expect that this 
way of solving knowledge controversies might give rise to very different modes of 
political practice, and it is part of the burden of this paper to pose the question of what 
they might be. 
 
If we fail to understand the nature of ‘as if’ knowledge claims, then we risk making 
interventions on questions of economic governance which miss the mark in profound 
ways. It is very common to criticise institutions of liberal market governance – 
including the World Trade Organization, but not only it – for governing by reference 
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to an idealised, naturalised vision of a perfect free market.90 I noted at the start of this 
paper that much of the last century or so of progressive thinking about the 
neoclassical conception of the market can be understood as the iterative development 
of four related critiques of market objectification: its falsity as a description of ‘real’ 
economic practices; its value-laden quality; its reification of what is in truth a socially 
constructed entity; and its conceptual indeterminacy. We have seen a surge after the 
global financial crisis of projects of this sort, which seek to re-found regimes of 
economic governance on conceptions of the market which take such critiques more 
fully into account. But, as Sloterdijk observed many years ago, ‘as if’ knowledge 
claims are always already ‘reflexively buffered’91 against this sort of criticism – 
precisely because they self-consciously foreground, and draw their strength from, 
precisely their fictionality, value-ladenness, constructedness and indeterminacy.  
 
For similar reasons, regimes of market governance organised in an ‘as if’ mode are 
equally resilient in the face of equally familiar criticisms of their narrowness of vision. 
In the context of WTO subsidies regulation, for example, the argument might be run 
that a fuller and more comprehensive evaluation of the desirability of a subsidies 
measure would take into account not only the trade impacts of the measure, but also 
its environmental, social, industrial and other objectives as part of a more holistic 
evaluative process of regulatory review. And of course this is just one instance of the 
ubiquitous criticism which is made of many regimes of market governance – that such 
regimes are too often guided solely by an assessment of economic impacts, to the 
exclusion of equally important social or environmental concerns. The reason that such 
criticisms miss the mark when they are directed against instances of ‘as if governance’ 
is that ‘as if’ knowledge claims draw their power precisely from their partiality, not in 
spite of it. The point of these knowledge claims is to cut short calculation, to exclude 
certain things from view, so as to enable action for a specific purpose.
92
  
 
Ezrahi has, rightly in my view, suggested that with the rise of post-objectivist thinking, 
we have seen the ‘decline of coherence as a norm or an ideal of public action’. In 
contemporary society, he notes,  
 
coherence tends to stand for pretense, untenable claims of knowledge and 
authority, and the unacceptable exercise of power. Incoherence, by contrast, 
seems to indicate humility, a refusal to suppress subjectivity and diversity, the 
toleration of numerous notions of purpose, causation and reality.93 
 
Where market governance is organised in an ‘as if’ mode, any knowledge claim that 
purports to provide an overall view – a more holistic or comprehensive perspective – 
is presumptively irrelevant. It is precisely the claim to provide a detached view – a 
‘view from nowhere’ or a ‘view from everywhere’94 – which can find no home in 
institutions of governance which operate on the basis of ‘the view from here’. 
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Conversely, the power of ‘as if’ knowledge claims comes from their explicit 
suitability to the particular objectives to a specific field of governance. ‘As if’ 
knowledge claims may be weak in the sense of having no validity or utility outside 
the field of governance for which they are produced, but what they give up in 
mobility and universality, they gain in strength and stability within their own space. It 
turns out that ‘as if’ knowledge claims can only be effectively contested by other ‘as 
if’ claims. What I mean by that is that they can only be contested by equally context-
bound knowledge claims, which explicitly demonstrate their relevance to the purposes 
and objectives of a particular regime of governance – or to an alternative version of 
those purposes and objectives. 
 
At the heart of ‘as if’ modes of governance is what Riles refers to as their ‘hollow 
core’,95 a space of ‘epistemological openness and ambivalence’.96 Global subsidies 
regulation, that is to say, does not operate by reference to a particular, substantive 
vision of the market, disciplining deviation from it. Rather, as I have said, it provides 
us with a set of relatively open-ended legal knowledge practices to define the relevant 
market benchmark on a case-by-case, context-by-context basis. Now, it will be argued 
in response that this hollowness is more apparent than real – that while the notion of 
the market may be indeterminate in principle, when operationalised in practice there 
are certain logics which operate to valorise and solidify a particular market vision at 
the regime’s heart. It may be argued, for example, that certain dominant visions of the 
purposes and objectives of the trade regime are what gives content – contingently, but 
nonetheless durably – to the market benchmarks operative in global subsidies 
regulation. Or that the underlying material logics at work in the field of international 
trade politics will ensure that the regime as a whole works in the interests of a 
particular set of powerful actors – who will be able to take advantage of the 
indeterminacy of the notion of the market to define it in ways which operate to their 
benefit. On this view, the apparent contingency and openness at the heart of global 
subsidies regulation may operate primarily to mask the underlying structural logics 
which durably and predictably determine its content. The task, from this perspective, 
is primarily to investigate the provenance and operation of such structuring logics.  
 
These logics are important, but in my view they represent only half the story, and 
perhaps not even the most important half. The crucial point is that regimes of ‘as if’ 
governance derive their power and stability precisely from their ‘hollow core’, and 
that power is therefore exercised in such regimes just as much by active processes of 
‘hollowing out’ as by processes of ‘filling in’ that core. I have said that the ‘as if’ 
knowledge claims derive their claims to acceptability not from their truth but from 
their pragmatic utility – they offers themselves as tools and techniques which enable 
practical action, not as a stable epistemic foundation for the formation of shared 
norms and goals. What gives such regimes their durability, then, is their ability to 
serve as the means for a variety of different ends, to offer techniques which are of use 
to as wide a range of actors as possible. Global subsidies regulation, in other words, is 
made stable precisely because, and to the extent that, it offers a set of techniques 
which can be used by China as much as the US, by West African cotton producers as 
much as European farmers. It is made stronger, rather than weaker, by the fact that 
many of us disagree about its underlying purposes – precisely because this 
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disagreement shows its ability flexibly to adapt itself to a variety of different interests 
and goals, both individual and shared, as the context requires. 
 
What this means is that there is a deeper structural logic at work, working precisely 
against the determining logics referred to above. The legal techniques themselves, in a 
manner of speaking, resist the attempts to give them a substantive core. If it is true 
that we must pay attention to the work which is always being done to stabilise a 
particular vision of the ‘market’, it is at least as important to attend to the huge 
amount of work which is constantly required to hollow out, de-structure, and re-open 
the epistemological heart of the regime, so as to ensure the regime’s continued 
stability. While we are now more than ever attuned to the existence of 
epistemological openness, we still tend to think of such openness solely as an inherent 
characteristic of knowledge itself – and to see epistemological closure as the result of 
an exercise of power. But, in fact, openness and contingency are just as much an 
effect of power as epistemological stability.97 To the extent that we focus our 
attention on the structuring logics which give a certain substantive direction and 
orientation to a regime of ‘as if’ governance, we risk overlooking the forms of power 
which actively work to hollow that regime out, to render it accessible to its subjects 
only as a technique or form. 
 
Such forms of power work, we might say, through the modes of evacuation and 
alignment. As an illustration of the former, think of the way that the regime of global 
subsidies regulation is organised so as to remove space for the collective definition or 
redefinition of its underlying purposes.98 As a general matter, negotiations in the 
WTO virtually never foreground issues of purpose and objective, instead focussing on 
the give and take of mutual concessions. In part as a result, there is no Preamble to the 
Subsidies Agreement which sets out an agreed set of objectives which it seeks to 
achieve. To the extent that such objectives are referenced – say, in WTO public 
relations material, or in the vernacular ways in which trade officials describe their 
jobs – it tends to be in terms so general and apparently self-evident that they serve 
mainly as empty placeholders. And, as I discussed earlier, where we do get evocations 
of the purpose is in the process of interpretation of the legal texts themselves – 
especially in the pages of scholarly journals, where lawyers and others argue about 
how the law ought to respond to a specific interpretive challenge. But it is in the 
nature of legal reasoning that the purposes of legal texts are treated as already given, 
to be inferred from existing practices and texts, rather than open for discussion. In 
other words, legal knowledge practices supply a space for the contingent production 
of local, individual and specific conceptions of the law’s purposes, rather than a space 
for producing a deeper underlying intersubjective consensus amongst regime 
participants, which may serve as the regime’s substantive foundation. In this sense, 
where regimes of knowledge founded on modern scientific practices are epistemically 
and normatively integrative, ‘as if’ governance regimes are (and must be) the opposite. 
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As to ‘alignment’, what I have in mind is the process of mutual readjustment which 
occurs in the interaction between a ‘tool’ and its ‘user’. If the knowledge claims 
characteristic of ‘as if’ governance offer themselves not as truths to be believed but as 
means to our ends, then the durability of this sort of governance regime depends on a 
resilient fit between the ‘means’ provided by the legal techniques in question, and the 
‘ends’ of its users. Creating this durable bond is a process of mutual readjustment, 
consisting not only of the ongoing alignment of the law to the interests of its users, 
but also of the production of ‘users’ who define their interests by reference to the 
means that the law makes available. It is in part through the use of the practical tools 
that a field of governance offers to us that we come to define our goals, both 
institutional and individual, in the way that we do. Such processes of individual and 
collective subjectivation remain thoroughly under-explored in the context of 
international economic governance. While it is clear that the WTO provides a set of 
legal techniques for its Members to deploy to further their objectives in international 
economic relations, to what extent is it also true that its Members end up defining 
their objectives in terms of the successful use of those techniques? There are certainly 
suggestions of such a process in that way that developing countries have come to see 
bringing successful WTO cases as a core goal of their trade policy. Similarly, the 
health and success of the WTO is often measured by reference to the conclusion of 
trade rounds and the smooth functioning of its dispute settlement system – that is, 
whether or not the techniques of governance which the regime makes available are 
actually being deployed. 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 
In this paper, I have sought to re-describe global subsidies regulation in the WTO as a 
regime of ‘as if’ economic governance. In this regime, ‘the market’ is produced as a 
different kind of artefact from that with which we are familiar: in place of the 
objectified market of economic knowledge, which confronts us as a fully naturalised 
entity with its own internal laws of motion, the market comes to be produced merely 
as series of a case-specific legal fictions. The concept of the market is deployed as a 
tool to act with, rather than a means of finding out the truth about the world – still less 
as a regulative ideal. It is the product of knowledge practices which self-consciously 
draw attention to their own partial perspective, their fragmentary and fictional quality, 
and their purely local acceptability. It turns out that this kind of epistemological 
artefact is vastly more stable, vastly more resilient to critique, than the objectified 
market more familiar to us. Whether or not this modality of governance has become 
or is becoming a general phenomenon – and I would agree with those who suggest 
that it is – it is certainly an important part of contemporary global economic 
governance, and we are only beginning to understand how it works. What range of 
subjectivities does this modality of governance elicit on the part of its subjects? To 
what new relations and associations does it give rise – both in terms of our relation 
with the law, and with other subjects of it? What new sites and techniques of power 
come into being in its operation, and what are the dynamics by which they are 
operationalised? To the extent that we continue to critique regimes of economic 
governance for their adherence to a naturalised image of the market, these are the 
questions we fail to ask. 
